Box 4.1. An Outline of the Four MA ScenariosIt is important to remember that no scenario will match the future as it actually occurs. None of the scenarios represents a “best” path or a “worst” path. There could be combinations of policies and practices that produce significantly better or worse outcomes than any of these scenarios. The future will represent a mix of approaches and consequences described in the scenarios, as well as events and innovations that could not be imagined at the time of writing (S5). The focus on alternative approaches to sustaining ecosystem services distinguishes the MA scenarios from previous global scenario exercises. The four approaches were developed based on interviews with leaders in NGOs, governments, and business on five continents, on scenario literature, and on policy documents addressing linkages between ecosystem change and human well-being. The approach to scenario development used in the MA consists of a combination of qualitative storyline development and quantitative modeling based on assumptions about the evolution of indirect drivers such as economic and population growth (S6). The Global Orchestration scenario explores the possibilities of a world in which global economic and social policies are the primary approach to sustainability. The recognition that many of the most pressing global problems seem to have roots in poverty and inequality evokes fair policies to improve the well-being of those in poorer countries by removing trade barriers and subsidies. Environmental problems are dealt with in an ad-hoc reactive manner, as it is assumed that improved economic well-being will eventually create demand for and the means to achieve environmental protection. Nations also make progress on global environmental problems, such as greenhouse gas emissions and the depletion of pelagic marine fisheries. However, some local and regional environmental problems are exacerbated. The results for ecosystem services are mixed. Human well-being is improved in many of the poorest countries (and in some rich countries), but a number of ecosystem services deteriorate by 2050, placing at risk the long-term sustainability of the well-being improvements. The Order from Strength scenario examines the outcomes of a world in which protection through boundaries becomes paramount. The policies enacted in this scenario lead to a world in which the rich protect their borders, attempting to confine poverty, conflict, environmental degradation, and deterioration of ecosystem services to areas outside the borders. These problems often cross borders, however, impinging on the well-being of those within. The Adapting Mosaic scenario explores the benefits and risks of environmentally proactive local and regional management as the primary approach to sustainability. In this scenario, lack of faith in global institutions, combined with increased understanding of the importance of resilience and local flexibility, leads to approaches that favor experimentation and local control of ecosystem management. The results are mixed, as some regions do a good job managing ecosystems but others do not. High levels of communication and interest in learning leads regions to compare experiences and learn from one another. Gradually the number of successful experiments begins to grow. While global problems are ignored initially, later in the scenario they are approached with flexible strategies based on successful experiences with locally adaptive management. However, some systems suffer long-lasting degradation. The TechnoGarden scenario explores the potential role of technology in providing or improving the provision of ecosystem services. The use of technology and the focus on ecosystem services is driven by a system of property rights and valuation of ecosystem services. In this scenario, people push ecosystems to their limits of producing the optimum amount of ecosystem services for humans through the use of technology. Often, the technologies they use are more flexible than today’s environmental engineering, and they allow multiple needs to be met from the same ecosystem. Provision of ecosystem services in this scenario is high worldwide, but flexibility is low due to high dependence on a narrow set of optimal approaches. In some cases, unexpected problems created by technology and erosion of ecological resilience lead to vulnerable ecosystem services, which may breakdown. In addition, the success in increasing the production of ecosystem services often undercuts the ability of ecosystems to support themselves, leading to surprising interruptions of some ecosystem services. These interruptions and collapses sometimes have serious consequences for human well-being. Source:
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Related publication:
Other Figures & Tables on this publication: Direct cross-links to the Global Assessment Reports of the Millennium Assessment Box 1. Biodiversity and Its Loss— Avoiding Conceptual Pitfalls Box 1.1. Linkages among Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, and Human Well-being Box 1.2. Measuring and Estimating Biodiversity: More than Species Richness Box 1.3. Ecological Indicators and Biodiversity Box 1.4. Criteria for Effective Ecological Indicators Box 2.1. Social Consequences of Biodiversity Degradation (SG-SAfMA) Box 2.2. Economic Costs and Benefits of Ecosystem Conversion Box 2.3. Concepts and Measures of Poverty Box 2.4. Conflicts Between the Mining Sector and Local Communities in Chile Box 3.1. Direct Drivers: Example from Southern African Sub-global Assessment Box 4.1. An Outline of the Four MA Scenarios Box 5.1. Key Factors of Successful Responses to Biodiversity Loss Figure 3.3. Species Extinction Rates Figure 1.3. The 8 Biogeographical Realms and 14 Biomes Used in the MA Figure 1.4. Biodiversity, Ecosystem Functioning, and Ecosystem Services Figure 2. How Much Biodiversity Will Remain a Century from Now under Different Value Frameworks? Figure 2.1. Efficiency Frontier Analysis of Species Persistence and Economic Returns Figure 3.3. Species Extinction Rates Figure 3.4. Red List Indices for Birds, 1988–2004, in Different Biogeographic Realms Figure 3.7. The Living Planet Index, 1970–2000 Figure 3.10. Main Direct Drivers Figure 3.12. Extent of Cultivated Systems, 2000 Figure 3.13. Decline in Trophic Level of Fisheries Catch since 1950 Figure 3.14. Estimated Global Marine Fish Catch, 1950–2001 Figure 3.15. Estimates of Forest Fragmentation due to Anthropogenic Causes Figure 3.15. Estimates of Forest Fragmentation due to Anthropogenic Causes Figure 3.15. Estimates of Forest Fragmentation due to Anthropogenic Causes Figure 3.15. Estimates of Forest Fragmentation due to Anthropogenic Causes Figure 3.15. Estimates of Forest Fragmentation due to Anthropogenic Causes Figure 3.15. Estimates of Forest Fragmentation due to Anthropogenic Causes Figure 3.16. Fragmentation and Flow in Major Rivers Figure 3.17 Trends in Global Use of Nitrogen Fertilizer, 1961–2001 (million tons) Figure 3.18 Trends in Global Use of Phosphate Fertilizer, 1961–2001 (million tons) Figure 3.20. Historical and Projected Variations in Earth’s Surface Temperature Figure 4. Trade-offs between Biodiversity and Human Well-being under the Four MA Scenarios Figure 4.3. Land-cover Map for the Year 2000 Figure 4.4. Conversion of Terrestrial Biomes Figure 4.5. Forest and Cropland/Pasture in Industrial and Developing Regions under the MA Scenarios Figure 4.6. Changes in Annual Water Availability in Global Orchestration Scenario by 2100 Figure 6.1. How Much Biodiversity Will Remain a Century from Now under Different Value Frameworks? Figure 6.2. Trade-offs between Biodiversity and Human Well-being under the Four MA Scenarios Table 1.1. Ecological Surprises Caused by Complex Interactions |